Navy Expeditionary Logistics by Apte, Uday
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository




Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/58784
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.




Creating Synergy for Informed Change 
May 9–10, 2018 
March 30, 2018 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943. 
- 426 - 
Navy Expeditionary Logistics 
Uday Apte—is a Distinguished Professor of Operations Management at the Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy (GSBPP), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. He also serves as 
the Associate Dean of Research and Development at GSBPP. Before joining NPS, Dr. Apte taught at 
the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, and at the Cox School of Business, 
Southern Methodist University, Dallas. He is experienced in teaching a range of operations 
management and management science courses in the executive and full-time MBA programs. Prior 
to his career in academia, Dr. Apte worked for over 10 years in managing operations and information 
systems in the financial services and utility industries. Since then he has consulted with several major 
U.S. corporations and international organizations. 
Areas of Dr. Apte’s research interests include service operations management, supply chain 
management, technology management, and globalization of information-intensive services. He has 
completed over 10 sponsored research projects for the U.S. DoD and has published over 60 articles, 
five of which have won awards from professional societies. His research articles have been published 
in prestigious journals including Management Science, Interfaces, Production and Operations 
Management (POM), Journal of Operations Management (JOM), Decision Sciences Journal (DSJ), 
IIE Transactions, and MIS Quarterly. He has co-authored two books, Manufacturing Automation and 
Managing in the Information Economy. Dr. Apte has served as a vice president of colleges at 
Production and Operations Management Society (POMS), as a founder and president of the POMS 
College of Service Operations, and as guest editor of POM journal. Currently he serves as the senior 
editor of POM and as associate editor of DSJ. 
Dr. Apte holds a PhD in Decision Sciences from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. His 
earlier academic background includes an MBA from the Asian Institute of Management, Manila, 
Philippines, and Bachelor of Technology (chemical engineering) from the Indian Institute of 
Technology, Bombay, India. 
Abstract 
The U.S. Navy, with its expeditionary warfare and logistics capabilities, is 
increasingly playing a critical role in conflicts involving non-state actors. Given the difficulties 
faced in expeditionary environments, managing expeditionary logistics is particularly 
challenging yet critically important today. In this research, we use case study methodology 
to better understand the current practices and challenges of expeditionary logistics at 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), a subordinate entity of Naval Expeditionary Combat 
Command (NECC), and to develop a set of concrete recommendations for improving 
expeditionary logistics processes at EOD. We also study the current definitions of 
expeditionary logistics to propose a definition better suited for today’s challenges, analyze 
similarities and differences between expeditionary logistics and commercial logistics, and 
develop concepts for successfully managing expeditionary logistics operations. 
- 427 - 
Introduction 
In recent decades, the United States and its coalition partner countries have 
increasingly engaged in conflicts involving non-state actors, and it appears that these 
conflicts are unlikely to subside in the foreseeable future. As a powerful maritime force, the 
U.S. Navy plays a critical role at sea and on land in these conflicts through its expeditionary 
warfare and logistics capabilities. The critical requirement here is to enable operational units 
to carry out a short-duration mission autonomously without the routine support of a base 
network. Given the difficulties faced in non-permissive expeditionary environments, 
managing expeditionary logistics is particularly challenging yet critically important today.  
However, our prior research shows that there exists scarcity of research literature or 
DoD documentation and guidance available on this important topic. The proposed research 
project will therefore begin to address this gap by developing conceptual frameworks and 
concrete recommendations on designing and successfully managing expeditionary logistics 
in non-permissive environments. 
In this research, we adopt a two-phased approach. In the first phase we study a 
specifc instance of current expeditionary logistics (ExLog) operations in practice to (1) better 
understand the key elements and critical success factors of ExLog, and (2) develop 
recommendations for improving logistical processes being studied. In the second phase we 
build on the results of the first phase to develop concepts useful for optimally designing 
ExLog processes and successfully managing them. The specific research questions we 
address in the second phase are: What is expeditionary logistics and what are its key 
components? What are the similarities and differences between expeditionary logistics and 
the traditional commercial logistics? What are some of the best practices of the traditional 
commercial logistics that Exlog can benefit from? How to successfully manage Exlog 
operations?  
As a starting point in this research we conducted an extensive literature survey of 
relevant research published in journals and books as well as documents published by the 
DoD on the topic. To limit the length of this symposium paper, however, we do not provide 
results of that literature survey, and provide instead only an overview of our own past 
relevant research in this area. In FY2014 we worked on an exploratory research project 
sponsored by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) on the topic of expeditionary logistics 
(Apte & Kang, 2015). A team of MBA students assisted us in that research by undertaking 
their MBA project to study the logistical challenges faced by the Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) and Naval Special Warfare (NSW) communities (Kundra, Brown, & 
Donaldson, 2014). The study indicated that the main shortcoming of logistical processes 
was in the information systems support, and the capture and analysis of information 
regarding the supplies, materiel, and equipment used in expeditionary logistics. In a follow-
up project funded by IMET, we developed a case based on our earlier research for use in an 
advanced logistics course (Yoho & Apte, 2018). This case is currently used in the capstone 
course of the logistics curriculum at GBBPP. Finally, continuing with our research on the 
same topic, two MBA students studied under our guidance the details of logistical processes 
supporting the deployment cycle of a Mine Countermeasure (MCM) Platoon at EOD 
(Reeves & Baker, 2017). 
We should mention that as of the writing of this symposium paper we have yet to 
complete our research on the topic and the work is ongoing. Specifically, we have 
completed the first phase, but the work in the second phase regarding the developments of 
concepts and theory about expeditionary logistics is ongoing. 
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This research report is organized into five sections. This introductory section is 
followed by the second section describing the organization and the mission of Explosive 
Ordnance Disposa (EOD), the specific instance of ExLog proceses we studied. The third 
section presents details of the logistical processes supporting the deployment cycle of a 
(hypothetical) Mine Countermeasure (MCM) Platoon at EOD, while the fourth section 
provides the analysis, conclusions, and recommendations concerning the management of 
those logistical processes at EOD. We complete the paper in the fifth and final section of 
this working paper with our initial thoughts on the characterization and definition of 
expeditionary logistics as well as the comparison of expeditionary and commercial logistics. 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) is a subordinate entity of the Navy 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) which is the Navy’s expert command regarding 
expeditionary operations and logistics. The NECC exists to man, train, equip, and sustain 
the Naval Expeditionary Forces (NEF) for bridging the gap from operations at sea to sea–
land joint operations. While the NECC command is relatively new, stood up by the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) in January 2006, NEF is old. The NECC is composed of eight 
subordinate entities that are their own respective commands which deliver the unique 
capabilities to the U.S. and its allied forces in the expeditionary realm: Costal Riverine, 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Naval Construction (Seabees), Expeditionary Intelligence, 
Combat Camera, Expeditionary Logistics, Maritime Civil Affairs and Training, and 
Expeditionary Combat Readiness. 
The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) is the Navy’s technical expert in locating, 
identifying, rendering safe, and explosively detonating foreign and domestic ordnance. 
Ordnance includes conventional, nuclear, biological, chemical, underwater, and improvised 
types of devices. The ability to control and dispose of these various types of dangerous 
devices enables theater access for Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), Expeditionary Strike 
Groups (ESGs), Naval Special Warfare, and Army Special Forces (SF). 
EOD is a history-rich, proud community that serves alongside many SPECOPS 
forces, as well as traditional Navy mission communities such as ships and submarines. The 
EOD technicians risk their lives to perform complex, technical defusing of mines, bombs, 
and improvised explosive devices (IED) and, of necessity, are required to be physically fit, 
superior swimmers, and athletes. EOD technicians undergo rigorous schoolhouse training 
prior to arriving at their commands and then complete operationally challenging tours filled 
with deployments and stressful workups due to the high operational tempo (OPTEMPO). 
EOD Group ONE, based in San Diego, CA, and EOD Group TWO, based in Little 
Creek, VA, are the two U.S.-based EOD elements. Each EOD group has five battalions and 
various shore detachments, platoons, and companies within them. The groups provide 
specially trained, combat ready, highly mobile EOD forces to support CSGs, amphibious 
ready group (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), MCM task forces and groups, NSW 
forces, Army SF, Military Sealift Command, unified theater commanders, CONUS Navy 
Region commander, and Homeland Defense and Contingency Operations. 
EOD Expeditionary Support Unit (EODESU) ONE and TWO follow the same 
geographical structure as their fellow expeditionary forces. EODESUs provide total logistics 
support to the EOD forces through financial, supply chain, and logistics management as well 
as operational planning and global force support. Prior to formation of EODESU, ExLog was 
performed by the EOD teams while simultaneously experiencing stressful OPTEMPOs and 
very dangerous deployments stacked one after the other. The purpose of the EODESU was 
to relieve the EOD mobile units of logistics and maintenance duties so they could focus on 
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their demanding operational duties. Also, the EODESUs are staffed with logistics and 
maintenance experts in order to perform those functions more efficiently and with increased 
precision, ultimately adding greater value to the Navy and improving the result provided to 
the warfighter.  
While ESU commands are not tasked with executing any of the highly technical and 
versatile missions the EOD teams are tasked with, they are tasked with equipping those 
teams with the proper gear and equipment to successfully execute the mission. In order to 
know what is required and understand the details necessary to complete these difficult 
missions, the ESU must be knowledgeable about the EOD missions and the gear and 
equipment EOD teams need.  
Mine Countermeasure Platoon at EOD: A Case Study 
This case study focuses on EOD Mobile Unit (EODMU); in particular on one of its 
Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Platoons. The case begins with an overview of the logistical 
processes and information systems used by EODESU TWO to provide the necessary to 
support a (hypothetical) MCM Platoon 1201. That is followed by a description of the MK-16 
equipment—an underwater breathing apparatus—since it is a heavily utilized piece of gear 
by the MCM Platoon. The case then tracks the logistical processes used to support the 
activities of the MCM Platoon throughout its deployment cycle. The case thus provides a 
realistic insight into the operations of the EODMU MCM Platoon and the logistical support 
operations of EODESU TWO. 
EODESU Supply 
The ESU units supply their teams as part of the services they provide. While the 
process by which the individual units perform this function may be slightly different, relatively 
speaking the same outcome is delivered. The EOD units supported by EODESU receive a 
variety of supplies and equipment, including expeditionary logistics overhaul (ELO) and 
general logistics and supply chain support. ELO is similar to the integrated logistics overhaul 
(ILO) process aboard ships but is specifically designed for expeditionary forces where they 
identify the gear needed to be repaired, reconditioned, or replaced. 
ESU teams issue the following types of gear to the EOD teams they support: 
 PGI (Personal Gear Issue) includes items such as uniforms, undershirts, 
socks, and other items that require some specificity to a member’s body and 
measurement.  
 TOA (Table of Allowances) consists of specific gear, equipment, systems, 
and materiel related to expeditionary missions. TOA includes items such as 
inflatable boats, generators, and specific wetsuits. The EOD teams keep this 
gear with them from the start of the Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) to 
the post-deployment return. TOA gear represents a challenge to the cost 
savings efforts due to constantly changing and non-standard nature of the 
gear allowed or allotted to the expeditionary teams based on their specific 
missions.  
 COSAL (Consolidated Shipboard Allowance Listing) includes items that the 
ship normally carries on board. The COSAL contains nomenclature, 
operating characteristics, technical manuals, and equipment descriptions as 
described in allowance parts lists (APL) and allowance equipage lists (AEL).  
 Other non-COSAL material.  
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The expeditionary requisitions processes are unique when compared to the standard 
fleet requisition processes. In the standard fleet requisition processes, over 95% of the 
requisitions are filled through the Navy supply system using National Stock Number (NSN) 
items, while less than 5% are open purchases. In comparison, in expeditionary logistics, 
approximately 70% of the requisitions are open purchases and only 30% are NSN 
requisitions (Kundra, Brown, & Donaldson, 2014). The expeditionary environment and 
mission add unique variables, such as distinctive operating environment, the need to stay 
current with technology, and the greater need for speed. Because of its availability, these 
situations force expeditionary units to rely heavily upon open purchases for commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) or local procurement products.  
To track and store information regarding the above gear, the ESU units use multiple 
information systems, including the following:  
 WASP: A warehouse and inventory management system 
 RCRP: Readiness and Cost Reporting System 
 R-Supply: A system that provides the Navy with online inventory, logistics, 
and financial magement tools 
 DPAS: A DoD-required system that tracks property valued greater than 
$5,000.  
The WASP, RCRP, R-Supply, and DPAS are distinctly different IT systems that are 
used to organize about the same type of information. In some cases, the information is 
actually the same, and duplicate efforts are being made to track and store transactions in 
different systems because the systems are not able to automatically share information with 
each other. For example, ESU tracks a transaction first in WASP and then manually enters 
the same information in RCRP. Another example is when supply parts are received from 
vendors at the ESUs and are automatically confirmed in R-Supply. Subsequently, the ESU 
members manually enter the same information that was just confirmed in R-Supply into 
WASP because the ESU teams use WASP as their internal inventory management system, 
and because there exists no interface to automatically share information between the two 
systems. A factor that further complicates the matter is a requirement to store information on 
an Accountable Property System of Record (APSR) system and since WASP is not an 
APSR system. 
Upon completion of the mission, training, or cycle, the gear that is not meant to be 
kept by a member is returned and inventoried. The gear return process is more than simply 
stacking and counting specific clothing articles or ammunition boxes. Given the nature of 
EOD missions, many times the gear gets returned, but in a heavily damaged and potentially 
unusable state. Therefore, ESU inspectors must know what separates returned, quality 
gear, from gear requiring minor maintenance or depot-level repair (DLR).  
In addition to managing the inventory of existing gear, ESU is required to properly 
document missing and damaged gear that is beyond repair. DD Form 200 is the Navy’s form 
for financial liability investigation, required in the process that is initiated by submitting a DD 
Form 200. The Navy must determine, based on DD Form 200, the reason the equipment 
was lost or damaged and who should be responsible, if anyone, for the cost to repair or 
replace. DD Form 200 is required as per DoD Directive 7200.11 for lost DoD-controlled 
property. It is a form that is filled out electronically, but ultimately it is also kept as a hard 
copy and entered into the ESU IT systems manually. ESU members are required to 
physically search archived DD Form 200s when they need to find information. 
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DD Form 1149 is another DoD directive form that is required when shipping through 
certain seaports or airports. The DD 1149 is specifically known as the Requisition and 
Invoice/Shipping Document to verify what was issued against the electronic records in 
WASP. This hard-copy document is also manually entered into systems and kept hard-copy 
for storage or later use when searching for information. There is a large collection of files at 
EODESU TWO of forms that are necessary to conduct business but are only stored as a 
hard copy. 
The MK-16 Underwater Breathing Apparatus 
Navy EOD is the only service manned, trained, and equipped to perform underwater 
render safe procedures and conduct EOD dive operations. Typical EOD mission sets 
include Mine Countermeasure (MCM), salvage diving, ship’s hull diving, search and rescue 
(SAR) operations, and other necessary diving missions. With such a variety of technically 
challenging and highly dangerous diving missions, EOD technicians are trained to perform 
and be successful at nearly any diving mission. The MK-16, therefore, is a common piece of 
equipment used in the EOD teams, and all EOD technicians are well-versed in its use and 
capabilities. 
The MK-16 was developed to reduce magnetic and acoustic signatures emitted by 
diving EOD technicians. The mission of EOD technicians is one that is highly technical, 
diverse, and dangerous. Under such tense work conditions, a superior diving suit is required 
that allows full range of motion but still provides protection from the natural and enemy 
hazards present in the area of operation (AO). The MK-16 breathing medium is maintained 
at a predetermined partial pressure of oxygen (PO2) that is monitored by sensors and 
controls to ensure diver safety. The reason divers are required to maintain a safe level of 
oxygen and are monitored so heavily is that depending on the mission, they may use more 
or less oxygen and cannot follow a standard timetable for bottom time.  
Along with MK-16, a diver’s other essential equipment includes knife, hook knife, 
strobe, smoke or flare, thermal protection, fins, and potentially a weapon as required. The 
knife has many uses, but one of its main uses is to help free a trapped diver from any 
number of hazards. The MK-16 equipment must withstand these conditions and not 
puncture, disconnect, or break easily. Strobes, smoke, and flares are essential safety gear 
for EOD technicians because at the depths required of some of the EOD missions, there is 
absolutely no natural visibility and those pieces of equipment could prove to be life-saving. A 
weapon is a necessity depending on the mission and AO in which the dive will take place; 
this is a harsh reminder that the mission is not a recreational dive but is highly important and 
dangerous. 
EODESU TWO has a team of maintainers as well as a GS civilian employee who 
accounts for and maintains the MK-16 system inventory. The GS civilian employee is known 
as the resident expert on the system. The benefit to having a civilian expert versus a military 
member is that ideally, the civilian remains the expert point of contact for a longer period of 
time, providing a long-term persistent presence as opposed to the routine rotations of 
assigned active duty personnel. This ensures retention of critical corporate knowledge 
regarding program supply and maintenance history. 
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The Logistical Support of MCM Platoon 
This case study focuses on the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Platoon 1201, which 
is a primary end-user of the MK-16. The case follows the supported unit through its training 
cycle, deployment, and ultimate return to the home base. 
Pre-Deployment 
Preparation for any deployment begins with a Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP), 
a codified training cycle. Concurrent with the assigned deployment schedule, the MCM 
Platoon undergoes a FRTP cycle like most other Navy units. The purpose of this process is 
to train, equip, and certify unit mission preparedness. FRTP consists of various milestones, 
including inspections, evaluations, training, and exercises. Each one of these events helps 
to build unit skill and cohesion, starting with basic, individualized training, and working 
toward more advanced, integrated training with external units. The process is designed to 
prepare the unit for the upcoming deployment based on available intelligence data (intel) 
gathered prior to heading into theater. This same intel is what EOSESU TWO uses to 
prepare supply and logistics support. EODESU TWO outfits the units during expeditionary 
logistics overhaul (ELO) and issues all of the required gear aside from what has already 
been issued for the team to be successful on deployment. 
The FRTP for an MCM Platoon begins with a tightly packed schedule of training 
events (also referred to as “workups”) lasting roughly 11 months from the start. Upon 
completion of the workup cycle, the platoon stays in a six-month sustainment phase, when 
they are certified for operations, and thus may be deployed early if necessary. Otherwise, 
they maintain their availability status until departing on a six-month deployment, which 
completes the 24-month deployment cycle. 
Prior to FRTP, the platoon receives expeditionary logistics overhaul (ELO) from 
EODESU TWO and begins workups. Part of the workups include successful completion of 
the requirements of the Training and Evaluation Unit (TEU). TEU does not completely 
oversee the FRTP process for the platoon, but provides training, classes, study materials 
and equipment, and some evaluation for how the unit is able to perform against the various 
elements of the deployment they are likely to face. At times, TEU directly issues some 
duplicate equipment that is required during the training. This prevents the platoon from 
utilizing primary issue equipment, and thereby avoiding any potential damage or loss to 
mission-essential gear, which in some cases can delay deployment or reduce mission 
capabilities of the unit. The TEU has its own supply of gear that it accounts for and 
purchases via EODESU TWO to support the unit training and evaluation process. ESU 
controls the budget used by TEU to purchase their course gear, which they acquire via DoD 
e-mall, GSA Advantage, GSA Leasing Support vendors, prime vendors, or other 
government sources of acquisition. The gear issued by TEU is generally the same as what 
is issued by ESU but a slight variation is possible. 
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ELO/Gear Issue 
At the start of the deployment cycle, platoon undergoes ELO to get outfitted with the 
gear required for training and subsequent deployment tasking. This ELO process facilitates 
the issuing of a baseline of standard gear that EODESU TWO has developed over time 
based on coordination with the EODMUs and their historical tasking. Scheduled six to 12 
months in advance, and based on long-term deployment rotations that are often available 
two years prior, the platoon’s ELO takes approximately three weeks to fully transfer the 
ownership of thousands of required pieces of gear from the ESU to the platoon. The process 
starts with coordination between EODESU TWO and EODMU, to deconflict an appropriate 
start date, based on all units that may need similar support.  
To start preparing for the ELO, EODESU TWO typically designates four Internal 
Airlift/Helicopter Slingable Container Unit 90 (ISU 90), along with a mini flyaway dive locker 
(FADL), for storage of all ELO gear issued to the platoon. At the completion of ELO, the 
ownership of these storage units will be transferred to the platoon. Before the gear is moved 
from the warehouse to the storage containers, EODESU supply personnel generate a DD 
1149 listing all of the items required for transfer. Each commodity manager is responsible for 
populating a DD 1149 with the appropriate items under his purview. These documents serve 
as the official inventory record for equipment ownership, and in the interim, also serve as an 
inventory checklist utilized by both ESU personnel and the platoon commander, for verifying 
all items transferred.  
The DD 1149 information must be entered in two separate systems. First, all items 
must be properly accounted for in the warehouse. The IT system utilized in maintaining an 
accurate warehouse accounting is Wedge Advanced Software Product (WASP). WASP is a 
standalone warehouse management system. ESU personnel must go into WASP to update 
the ownership/location status of each item, as it is transferred to the storage containers. 
Additionally, this same supply/inventory information must be entered into the Navy’s 
Readiness and Cost Reporting Program (RCRP), which is the approved system of record for 
use in official reporting up the Navy chain of command, and which is not connected to 
WASP. Though WASP is not an approved system of record, it is used locally for the 
convenience and simplicity it provides in managing the local inventory.  
DPAS warehouse is another inventory management system that is available to the 
supply community that satisfies about the same requirements as WASP, but adds date entry 
efficiencies such as bar code scanners. EODESUs have yet to implement the new system. 
WASP is utilized for the majority of ELO transfer items, but not for underwater items. Due to 
the much smaller inventory of underwater items, the dive locker works primarily with RCRP 
(for ownership transfer), OMMS (for repair/maintenance), and spreadsheets (for ad hoc local 
tracking). Once the containers have been filled, and ESU and the platoon commander have 
verified the transfer, the platoon commander signs the DD 1149, accepting ownership of the 
containers and their contents. 
While the platoon usually receives the entire complement of gear required for 
deployment, at times, adjustments to the process are made based on supply availability and 
community demand for limited equipment, such as the MK-16. For example, the dive locker 
may delay issuance of the MK-16 if there is excess demand for use at the TEU in preparing 
other units for their own deployment schedule. Additionally, since mine countermeasures is 
a primary mission of MCM platoons, they are typically outfitted with MK-16 at the start of 
workups, regardless of needs of others. However, other platoons that treat mine 
countermeasures as a secondary mission may experience a delay in isuing the MK-16 
during workups. However, in case of delay, they are provided equipment on a short-term 
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basis as they commence specific MK-16 training evolutions during the workup cycle, and 
receive the full issue prior to deployment. 
After about 18 months of training and sustainment, MCM platoon is deployed. During 
sustainment and deployment, the process for acquiring repair and replacement equipment is 
essentially an à la carte version of the ELO process, which is discussed in the following 
section. 
Deployment 
Upon completion of the training cycle, any training-specific gear issued by the dive 
locker is returned, and any outstanding ELO gear requirement is fulfilled by the ESU prior to 
departure. The unit then embarks on the deployment to support real-time tasking from 
theater commanders, execute pre-planned missions, or operate independently, depending 
on theater demands. The MCM Platoon 1201 is tasked with conducting a dive mission to 
clear a port in the Persian Gulf. This is a routine anti-terrorism/force protection (ATFP) 
mission to ensure safe passage for a naval surface action group (SAG), scheduled to arrive 
soon. 
This EOD MCM Platoon is made up of eight EOD technicians. As part of their 
standard complement of gear, they are issued five MK-16 units and one operational support 
kit (OSK), which should be enough to handle the job. After four days of dive operations, two 
of the MK-16 units are in need of servicing. Several O-rings need replacement and one of 
the units needs an oxygen addition valve replaced. Until they are serviced, these MK-16s 
are not safe for use. In order to meet the necessary pace of operations and to avoid any 
extended time on station, they need to get the equipment repaired. Fortunately, these items 
are available within the OSK. After a quick repair evolution, all MK-16 units are fully 
operational. This allows the platoon to meet the mission requirements as scheduled, and 
more importantly, this allows a follow-on naval SAG to pull into port safely and on time. 
The use of parts from the OSK, along with a subsequent replenishment request from 
the platoon, create a demand signal for execution back at EODESU TWO. The goal is to 
maintain a fully-stocked OSK, to provide some maintenance capacity on-site. With other 
commodities, the platoon typically coordinates with the Expeditionary Support Element 
(ESE), based in the theater. The ESE routes these requests through the appropriate 
commodity manager at ESU TWO for processing. However, in the case of underwater 
commodity items such as the O-rings and oxygen addition valve, they typically send e-mail 
to the dive locker personnel directly to request the necessary items. From a supply 
standpoint, this current request can be fulfilled in two different ways. The routine expendable 
items (the O-rings), are available immediately from the supply warehouse. The commodity 
manager enters the request in OMMS, which routes the request through the chain of 
command for approval. Once approved, the request goes to the warehouse to tag the O-
rings for distribution to Platoon 1201. The oxygen addition valve, however, is considered a 
depot-level repair (DLR) item, and therefore is handled somewhat differently. DLR basically 
means that the item cannot be locally serviced, and must be sent to a dedicated repair 
facility. The oxygen addition valve is requested in similar fashion as the O-rings, using e-mail 
and an OMMS job order. However, the platoon must also send the failed part back to the 
ESU for exchange. The exchanged part is turned in to the depot repair facility, where it is 
refurbished or discarded as unserviceable. The repair facility provides a replacement part to 
ESU, likely a refurbished item from a previous repair. The dive locker at the ESU then 
generates a DD 1149 to document the parts delivery, make any necessary updates required 
in RCRP, and ship the O-rings and oxygen addition valve out to Platoon 1201. Upon receipt, 
the platoon has a DD 1149 for their records, and the OSK is back to full operational status. 
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This process repeats throughout the deployment, to facilitate repair and replacement activity 
on the MK 16. 
Post-Deploymnt 
Upon return, the Platoon 1201 follows up with EODESU TWO, to conduct all 
necessary equipment turn-in, along with associated documentation processes. The purpose 
of this effort is to reconcile supply-related activity that occurred throughout deployment and 
close out any outstanding logistics support requirements. While the Platoon 1201 is able to 
turn in its equipment with a materiel loss of about 5%, the record of the past turn-ins show 
that it is not uncommon to experience a materiel loss of as much as 30%. 
Just as when the platoon received initial gear issue, the primary process for gear 
return is also ELO. This involves presenting any remaining gear to the supply warehouse for 
reconciliation. ESU personnel receive the gear, accept functional or repairable gear into 
inventory, and properly account for other equipment that is either unusable or lost. 
Functional gear may be cleaned and prepped for immediate redeployment, while repairable 
gear will be processed for repair or refurbishment before being returned to mission-capable 
status. ELO and associated data reconciliations to RCRP are important steps in the process 
for ensuring accountability for inventory levels. These steps support the ongoing financial 
improvement and audit readiness (FIAR) initiative across the DoD. 
For TOA and PGI gear, Platoon 1201 returns to the supply warehouse at EODESU 
TWO to transfer ownership of the preponderance of ELO. Again, the process takes 
approximately three weeks to complete. Using the original DD 1149 document from ELO 
issue, along with accumulated DD 1149s generated throughout deployment for parts orders, 
the Platoon 1201 commander works with ESU personnel to inventory all returned items. All 
equipment is designated as mission-capable, serviceable, unserviceable, or missing. After 
accounting for all items, ESU personnel return to WASP and RCRP for appropriate 
electronic transfer of ownership. In the case of unserviceable or missing items, a form DD 
200 must be generated to account for the loss. It is the responsibility of Platoon 1201 to 
generate the DD 200 and route it through their chain of command for review. A copy is 
provided to EODESU TWO to facilitate record keeping and to ensure inventory items are 
appropriately removed in WASP and RCRP, to avoid overstating the value and quantity of 
existing inventory. 
Occasionally, due to operationally constrained deployment timelines, there is 
pressure to expedite the ELO process between deploying and returning platoons. A solution 
employed by EODESU TWO is a modified ELO. Requiring a surge of personnel and a tightly 
coordinated schedule, this allows a returning platoon to transfer inventory directly to another 
platoon starting workups. This also requires coordinated commitment from both platoons 
and ESU, and can reduce the typical three-week process down to one week. 
Analysis, Conclusions and Recommendations Regarding the Logistical 
Processes at EOD 
The problems and shortcoming of logistical processes described in the previous 
section were analyzed using selected tools of Lean Six Sigma (LSS), a process 
improvement methodology. Specifically, we used tools such as the Process Flowchart and 
the Cause and Effect analysis (resulting in a Fishbone Diagram). The Fishbone Diagram is 
provided in Figure 1, while a discussion of the cause and effect analysis follows. It should be 
noted that the analysis is organized as per the major causes shown in the Fishbone 
Diagram. As a sample, the flowchart of ELO/Gear Issue process is provided in the appendix. 
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After preparing flowcharts of all processes, they were analyzed to identify root cause(s) of 
various problems facing the expeditionary logistics operations. 
 
Figure 1. Fishbone Chart 
Information Technology (IT) System Support 
As previously mentioned, EOD represents a very small portion of the Navy’s overall 
manning. Consequently, they are unable to claim funding that would permit them to have a 
written contract tailored with an inventory management program to meet their needs. As a 
result, EOD “makes do” with the systems it has: the commonly available commercial 
products such as WASP for inventory management and Navy-approved systems such as R-
supply for financial management. WASP was implemented as an inventory management 
system several years ago. It is an improvement over their previous methods of using 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. The use of multiple systems to perform inventory 
management results in an ad hoc inventory management system that requires double 
entries to maintain duplicate databases, as well as extensive, lengthy periods of on-the-job 
training to master the systems. Multiple systems are required to maintain equipment 
inventories, and specific programs are required to be used for certain categories of 
equipment. Moreover, none of the databases for these inventory management programs are 
able to share information with the software used to track finances (R-Supply). 
The effect this is having on the EOD logistics operations is reduced efficiency and 
effectiveness. For a typical Logistics Specialist, a tour in an expeditionary unit is unusual. 
The requirement to use multiple computer systems negates a key benefit of computer 
technology by multiplying the work required by the user. The need to perform repetitive data 
entries is also an invitation for natural human error. These inevitable errors introduce 
inaccuracies into the inventory and usage data, contribute to a loss of accountability and an 
inability to optimally manage inventory, and reduce buying power for the taxpayer. 
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Most who serve in such a unit do so for only one tour, and the majority in the Navy 
spend an entire career on sea-going ships. As a result, most systems that a logistician 
encounters in an expeditionary command are highly unfamiliar. These programs have no 
formal Navy training available and the Sailor must learn through on-the-job training for up to 
18 months. However, as we understand, the USMC utilizes logistics programs along with the 
associated schools. We recommend further research be conducted to determine if similar 
programs and schools could be adapted for use by Navy. 
Procurement and Contracting 
This study showed that EODESU relies heavily on open purchases using contracts 
or government credit card through the commercial sources. The goal is to have the gear 
fixed or replaced through the fastest means possible. Relying on the readily available 
product allows them to procure and stay current with technology advancement at a much 
faster rate in an effort to always stay ahead of the next potential threat. 
During our research we found that Naval Special Warfare (NSW) possess an organic 
ability to write and administer contracts. This greatly increases the speed with which 
equipment and services are obtained at NSW while reducing the workload on the unit’s 
logisticians. In contrast, EOD is required to use the contracting services of the Fleet 
Logistics Center (FLC). This increases delays and administrative workload. As mentioned 
earlier, EOD represents a very small portion of the Navy’s overall manning. Consequently, 
they are unable to claim funding that would permit them to have a written contract tailored 
with an inventory management program to meet their needs. 
There is a demand for cutting-edge equipment among members of the EOD 
community. This compels their logistics support units to rely heavily on the use of their 
government commercial purchase card (GCPC.) The Navy’s supply system is best suited to 
providing parts and equipment to traditional ships and submarines. Relative to EOD, these 
platforms face threats and challenges that change slowly, and as a result, the equipment 
and supplies they need are slow to change. This is not the case with expeditionary units. 
They operate in a much more dynamic environment. While a ship may have a service life of 
up to 50 years, much of the equipment used by EOD has a service life that is measurable in 
months. This time frame does not permit economical parts support. Incorporating this into 
the traditional maintenance model of a sea-going ship could be meaningful. The GCPC 
permits these commands to obtain the required equipment quickly, but this does not come 
without consequence. The process of purchasing with Government Purchase Card records 
purchase information in a form that is not readily accessible to external organizations. For 
example, you record the total dollar amount spent on a purchase in one system; however, 
the list of purchased items gets recorded individually into a different system. The two 
systems are not compatible with each other. The amount spent and the list of items on that 
purchase can only be reconciled manually by reviewing the original receipt. As a result, 
demand history is lost along with the ability to easily audit expenditures. Without any 
accurate demand history, the task of procurement and inventory management becomes 
significantly more difficult. 
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Equipment Visibility and Accountability 
The process used to issue and maintain accountability of equipment is inadequate, 
particularly during a unit’s deployment. Based on the preliminary information available at the 
time of this research and the interviews of subject matter experts, this study’s researchers 
estimated that loss of materiel accountability is, at times, as high as 30% for EOD. This is 
mainly attributable to the methods used to assign and record accountability for equipment, 
the relative ease with which equipment can be replaced, and the inability to detect trends in 
purchases and/or surveys. 
Prior to deployment, accountability for the equipment is assigned to an individual or 
team using a paper DD form 1149. During the EOD deployment, no supply or logistics 
personnel from the team’s unit are deployed with them to provide support to deployed 
equipment and, as a result, the responsibility for maintaining custody falls to the 
Expeditionary Support Element (ESE) in theater. The ESE is required to do these using 
possibly suboptimal methods such as Excel spreadsheets or a locally maintained database. 
It should be noted that even when the database is a familiar program, if the EOD unit is 
being deployed with another service, the unit is required to use that service’s program. This 
introduces inefficiencies and reduces effectiveness in a manner similar to that previously 
described. 
While deployed, the teams’ focus understandably shifts to the successful 
accomplishment of the mission. Equipment, however, can be damaged or lost and 
replacements are obtained from respective in-theater logistics support units to ensure 
maximum readiness. This use of locally deployed support personnel helps the team 
maintain its capability to accomplish assigned tasks. It is likely, however, that separating the 
functions that maintain accountability from those that use the equipment helps create a 
culture in which containing materiel costs are not a major. 
The paper DD 1149 records are maintained at the team’s homeport and are unable 
to be updated when equipment is lost or destroyed and subsequently replaced. Additionally, 
because gear that is deployed with a unit is by definition “mission essential,” replacing it is a 
high priority. Consequently, a given piece of equipment may be replaced several times 
during a deployment, but it is only upon the team’s return to home port that its equipment 
and equipment inventory records are reconciled. Some gear is deployed and returns with an 
individual Sailor or unit and discrepancies will be detected after the six-month deployment is 
concluded. As described previously, however, because these purchases are likely to have 
been made using a GCPC, the record of any replacements purchased during this time is 
largely obscured. 
Additionally, a significant amount of equipment will only be reconciled after 18 
months or may never be reconciled at all. Certain pieces of equipment are too costly to 
warrant purchasing in quantities sufficient to provide to each unit or too large to 
economically deploy and redeploy with a designated unit. This equipment is designated 
RIP/TOA and is turned over in theatre as units are relieved. Although this equipment may 
have a high value, because it may be more than a year since accountability was first 
assigned and procuring replacements for deployed equipment is relatively easy, this 
equipment may never be reconciled but simply “written off.” 
Because the method required to document and track equipment loss/damage relies 
upon hard copy paper documentation, it is likely that there is no effective means to 
accurately determine the cause of the loss/damage. Also, because of the nature of the 
control systems in place and the culture and attitudes it may engender, it is also unlikely that 
individuals with assigned accountability will be held accountable in the event of loss or 
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damaged equipment. Lost, destroyed, and unserviceable equipment is properly recorded 
using the DD form 200. These forms, however, are produced at a rapid rate and the logistics 
units require several large binders to maintain a record of these forms. The documentation 
process is methodical. It is likely, however, that the sheer volume of paperwork makes it 
very difficult to assure accuracy in individual cases and to discern long-term patterns. 
Instead, the skill and memories of the unit’s leaders and Sailors become the primary means 
for detecting trends. The reliance on paper forms and the volume with which they are 
produced places a significant administrative burden on the EOD logistics support commands 
while simultaneously obscuring trends in the information these forms record. It is probable 
that these factors make it unlikely that an individual Sailor will suffer any consequences in 
the event of a loss of accountability. This is because the same factors also make it difficult to 
detect a loss due to negligence or theft. The systems may also create the perception that 
the forms are a “paperwork drill.” With this perception, it is likely Sailors prioritize their core 
mission responsibilities above any fiduciary accountability they may be assigned. In such an 
environment, it would also be inappropriate to punish the Sailor for responding to the 
incentives which he has been given. 
Organization and Culture 
The case study identifies a number of areas that offer the possibility of improved 
financial and operational efficiency. When considering the nature of these opportunities and 
the circumstances that brought them about, it becomes apparent that several key factors are 
at work. First among these is the miniscule size of the EOD community relative to the size of 
the traditional Navy. Because the expeditionary community makes up a relatively small 
portion of the Navy in terms of both manning and the number of mission sets to which it 
contributes, it is likely that the community’s requirements are naturally assigned lower 
priority than those of the maritime force. The Navy must make choices regarding how it 
spends its resources to obtain the most satisfaction from its large, but nevertheless finite, 
resources. Consequently, it is plausible that an organization the size of the Navy would be 
unable to completely meet the needs of a minority of stakeholder organizations like EOD. 
Another factor that contributes to the inefficiencies observed in the case of EOD is 
the diverse nature of the commands which make up NECC and their relative sizes. NECC is 
composed of 10 separate commands, with SEABEEs claiming more than half of NECC’s 
personnel. At least on the West coast, this has resulted in the SEABEE culture dominating 
the NECC community and its requirements being given de facto higher priority. 
Environment 
Every expeditionary mission is different. While there are some similarities, the 
composition of the units deploying, the duration, and the environment where units are 
deployed can vary greatly. The following are some unique aspects of the operating 
environments that the expeditionary units face that make providing logistical support more 
challenging: 
 Local vendors are used to provide as many supplies as possible.  
 The dynamic, high-risk environment requires the latest technology to give the 
units that are deployed the best “edge” or competitive advantage possible.  
 Information technology support is often unavailable during deployments due 
to the remote and/or austere environments.  
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Recommendations 
The cause and effect analysis described earlier has led to the following set of 
recommendations for improving the logistical processes of EODESU: 
 Information systems are highly inadequate and require multiple manual entry 
processes. Develop and introduce new information systems that will support 
expeditionary logistics. As an interim step, develop interfaces to enable single 
entry of data. 
 Two important considerations to keep in mind before designing new 
information systems are (1) to first streamline the logistical processes and 
then design the information systems to fit the needs of that process, and (2) 
identify the data that will be needed to optimally manage the inventory and 
then design the information to capture those data elements.  
 Currently, everything is on-the-job training with little knowledge capture or 
dissemination. Develop and deliver specific logistics training and education.  
 When purchasing using government credit card (GCPC), the information is 
not tracked about which item is purchased, or how much or how often it is 
purchased. GCPC is a financial system and not a logistics system; it is used 
for tracking the amount of purchase but not what was purchased or its 
quantity. 
 Given the large amount of money that passes through EODESU, having a 
full-time contracting official could possibly save money and time. 
 There is a temptation to believe that because each expedition is unique and 
that the organization has always been able to “make it happen,” there is no 
need to improve processes from both efficiency and effectivity perspectives. 
However, there are always some commonalities between different 
expeditions and those commonalities should be identified and leveraged to 
achieve process improvements.  
Expeditionary Logistics: Preliminary Concepts 
Joint Publication 4.0 defines logistics as “planning and executing the movement and 
support of forces” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). Expeditionary logistics falls on the line 
between the operational and tactical levels. There are several definitions for expeditionary 
logistics available in various military instructions and publications. NECC adopted the 
expeditionary logistics definition stated in Navy Tactical Reference Publication 1–02, which 
defines expeditionary logistics as 
the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of 
an armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign 
county. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operation 
that deal with design and development, acquisition storage, movement, 
distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; movement, 
evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; acquisition or construction, 
maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or 
furnishing of services. 
The levels of logistics correspond directly to the three levels of war: strategic, 
operational, and tactical. Strategic logistics focuses on organizing, training, and equipping 
the SOF forces, whereas operational logistics provides the link between tactical 
requirements to strategic capability in order to accomplish operational goal. They provide 
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theater-wide logistical support, closely monitor in-theater shortfalls, communicate shortfalls 
to strategic sources, and continuously match tactical requirements with strategic recourses. 
Finally, tactical logistics primarily focuses on providing key services to support battles and 
engagements. 
Two primary key areas of focus for ExLog are Sustainment and Combat Service 
Support. Sustainment provides forces the necessary equipment and services to maintain 
and/or prolong operations until successful mission completion. Effective sustainment allows 
combat commanders and expeditionary forces to have depth to seize, retain, exploit, and 
conduct decisive operations. Combat Service Support allows forward operating forces to 
have necessary supplies, equipment, transportation needs, and various services to support 
elements in theater at all levels of war. 
Expeditionary logistics is challenged with the “tyranny of distance” since it often 
operates in areas far from Navy supply and distribution chains. Expeditionary logisticians 
often rely on host nations for support and make heavy use of local contracts, vendor 
support, and commercially available supplies. 
ExLog: Functional Areas 
Expeditionary Logistics is comprised of six functional areas: supply, maintenance, 
transportation, general engineering, medical, and other service (food, disbursing, postal, 
MWR, etc.). The main three components of logistics are supply, maintenance, and 
transportation. 
 Supply functions as a materiel and financial management support that is 
similar to Supply Department afloat. The functions include ordering, 
procurement, receipt, stowage, and inventory control of repairable and 
consumables items. 
 Maintenance functions as a team responsible for developing and performing 
all maintenance policies and procedures. In addition, they are also 
responsible for all equipment maintenance that preserves, repairs, and 
maintains reliability. 
 Transportation takes care of movement of personnel and materiel from one 
point to another. They are well versed in worldwide ports of embarkation, 
debarkation, inter-theater, and intra-theater locations. 
 Expeditionary Engineering is primarily a function of the Naval Construction 
Force, commonly referred to as “Seabees.” Seabees can be deployed 
independently or can be imbedded into other expeditionary units. Seabees 
are capable of a wide range of construction services such as combat 
engineering, rapid runway repair, facility damage repair, combat engineering, 
bridge and road construction, and maintaining facilities ashore. In addition, 
they also provide responsive support in disaster recovery operations and 
perform civic action construction projects to improve relations with other 
nations. 
 Health services include all medical, dental, and all health-related functions 
(combat and non-combat) to include: health maintenance, entomology, 
medical readiness of personnel, food service sanitation, treatment of 
casualties, and medical evacuation. 
 Other Logistic Services function as a general area that includes services such 
as food, post, disbursing, exchange, billeting, legal, barber, laundry, and 
other administrative services and functions. 
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Comparison of Expeditionary and Commercial Logistics 
Table 1 shows a comparison of expeditionary logistics and traditional commercial 
logistics along multiple dimensions. Expeditionary logistics often operates in foreign 
countries, in areas far from traditional Navy supply and distribution chains. Consequently, 
expeditionary logisticians often rely on host nations for support and heavily depend on local 
contracts, vendor support, and commercially available supplies. 
Expeditionary logisticians support expeditionary situations that are substantially 
different and challenging as compared to those faced by the logisticians supporting 
traditional commercial operations. The stock keeping unit (SKU) variety-to-volume ratio—
which describes the ratio of the number of different types of SKUs relative to the total 
volume of demand—is typically much higher in expeditionary operations. Meaning, the 
assortment of items is relatively high given the overall relatively low volume of logistical 
support demand. Table 1 provides a comparison of expeditionary logistics and commercial 
logistics along several dimensions. 
Table 1. Comparison of Expeditionary vs. Commercial Logistics 
Nature of Operation Expeditionary 
Logistics 
Commercial Logistics 
Location Foreign Country Domestic and/or 
Foreign 
Duration Short Term Long Term 
Occurrence Irregular Routine 
Demand Variable  More predictable 
SKU Variety-to-Volume Ratio High Low 
Operational Tempo Unpredictable Steady 
Level of Risk High Low 
Desired Service Level Very high due to low on-
hand inventory levels 
Medium to high due to 
the availability of local 
or regional distribution 
hubs 
Distribution Dispersion Low demand across 
many locations to serve 
few customers at each 
location 
Use of large distribution 
centers or retail 
locations to serve many 
customers 
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Appendix: ELO/Gear Issue Process 
Mobile unit submits requirement request using a DD Form 1149 (Requisition and 
Invoice/Shipping form). Supply Department (for PGI) or Materiel Department (for TOA) 
checks its WASP if the item is in stock. 
(a) If the item is in stock, it is delivered to the unit. 
(b) If the item is out of stock, check if it is a Navy NSN item. 
(i) if Navy NSN item (30%):  
Order through R-Supply 
The order goes through Navy Supply System and funds are 
subtracted 
When the item arrives, R-Supply is updated 
The item is issued to the platoon and WASP is manually 
updated 
(ii) If Non-Navy NSN (70%):  
If cost > $3,000 or performance period > 90 days, send to 
Contracting; otherwise, open purchase:  
Order through R-Supply 
Funds are obligated using GCPC and paid to the 
vendor 
When the item arrives, R-Supply is updated 
The item is issued to the platoon and WASP is 
manually updated 
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